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TOWARDS RATIONALIZING MULTIPLE COMPETITION POLICY ENFORCEMENT 
PROCEDURES: THE ROLE OF LEAD JURISDICTION CONCEPTS 
 
By Prof. Oliver Budzinski# 
Abstract: Lead jurisdiction models represent one option how to extend and enhance contemporary 
interagency cooperation among competition policy regimes. They constitute a multilateral, case-related 
form of cooperation that is suited to effectively create a one-stop-shop for the prosecution of international 
cartels, the handling of cross-border mergers and acquisitions and the governance of international antitrust 
cases. Thus, lead jurisdiction models offer considerable economic benefits. However, they also entail 
several caveats. Three possible working problems and downside effects of lead jurisdiction models in 
international competition policy enforcement are discussed in this paper.  
JEL-Codes: F02, F53, F55, K21, L40, D02 
Keywords: international competition policy, lead jurisdiction models, international governance, 
interjurisdictional cooperation, interagency cooperation, competition economics, antitrust 
1. Introduction 
1. In a globalized world, the radius of business activities often extends the geography of 
jurisdictions. As a consequence, pro- and anticompetitive business strategies and arrangements with cross-
border effects may face competition policy scrutiny of the very same case in several jurisdictions and by 
several authorities. Such multiple proceedings of one and the same antitrust case entail considerable 
disadvantages that have been extensively discussed in the literature: 
• increasing transaction costs for companies who are forced to submit materials to and comply with 
procedures and outcomes of multiple competition policy authorities (ICN 2002), 
• increasing burden on taxpayers due to the parallel investigation of virtually the same case facts 
by multiple authorities (with comprehensive references Budzinski 2014), 
• divergent outcomes (with comprehensive references Budzinski 2008a: 33-49), and 
• power asymmetries between different authorities allowing for beggar-thy-neighbor strategic 
policies (for instance, non-prosecution of export cartels into small and developing countries with 
weak authorities) (with comprehensive references Budzinski 2008a: 54-64). 
2. So far, cooperation among antitrust authorities focuses strongly on minimizing the risk of 
divergent outcomes by means of information exchange, mutual notification and consultation, mutual 
assistance and (at times) negative comity. This is in particular true for bilateral cooperation agreements 
(Budzinski 2008a: 49-53; Budzinski 2014: 10-12).1 Furthermore, the currently most important multilateral 
                                                     
1  There are some few exceptions, though, like for instance the cooperation between the competition 
authorities of Australia and New Zealand that include cross appointments of senior commissioners to cases 
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forum, the International Competition Network, does not include considerable case-related ambition of 
cooperation but rather concentrates on (softly and voluntarily) harmonizing competition policy cultures by 
defining non-binding best practices (Budzinski 2004a; Budzinski 2008a: 142-148; Budzinski 2014: 14-20). 
In line with the goals of this OECD Hearing2 and since I have written about these issues extensively 
elsewhere, I will not go into the questions of deficiencies of uncoordinated national competition policy 
regimes, insufficiencies of hitherto (bilateral and multilateral) cooperation agreements and practices or 
welfare effects of international competition policy3 in this paper. Instead, I will focus on discussing a 
particular concept aiming to solve the remaining problems of multiple proceedings by enhanced 
cooperation among (competent) competition authorities. The concept concentrates on rationalizing 
competition policy enforcement as to economize on transaction costs and taxpayer burden. In doing so, this 
concept clearly extends the boundaries of the antitrust cooperation frameworks that are currently in place. 
Whether there is a political will to establish the necessary reforms may be doubtful, at least in the short 
run. However, this shall not stop academic thinking about possible solutions, their institutional shape, 
working mechanisms and economic performance.  
3. The concept that I will discuss in this paper, drawing closely on former research of mine 
(Budzinski 2008a, 2009, 2011), is the idea of a multilevel lead jurisdiction model where a lead agency 
investigates and handles a given case on behalf of the other affected jurisdictions – and with their support – 
and decides a case while recognizing the legitimate interests of all affected jurisdictions. This ambitious 
idea combines the concepts of lead jurisdictions and multilevel governance (section 2) and poses a number 
of crucial questions as to its institutional design and working properties (section 3):  
• what is the lead agency and how should it be selected? 
• what competences would be delegated (and by whom) to the lead agency? 
• what are the incentives to ‘getting the cases right’ (vis-à-vis strategic interests)? 
• what are the (economic) advantages and disadvantages? 
4. Eventually, I will highlight some limits and open research questions (section 4) before I conclude 
(section 5). So, what is a lead jurisdiction model and how can it be combined with multilevel governance? 
2. Lead Jurisdiction Models as Enhanced Cooperation: Concept and Principles 
The economic literature offers, inter alia, two interesting concepts for enhanced international cooperation. 
The first concept is the idea of a lead jurisdiction model (Campbell & Trebilcock 1993, 1997; Trebilcock & 
Iacobucci 2004). It extends the positive comity concept by allocating competence and responsibility for 
multijurisdictional competition cases to one of the affected regimes that subsequently handles and decides 
the case with a view to avoiding anticompetitive effects in the overall geographic market (i.e. in all 
affected jurisdictions) and by relying on the assistance of the other involved regimes. Two variants of lead 
jurisdiction can be distinguished: the model of a voluntary lead jurisdiction (advanced comity principle) 
                                                                                                                                                                             
that affect both jurisdictions. Thus, a ‘common’ case is conducted by a team to which a commissioner of 
the other country is associated. See the intervention of the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission in this hearing. 
2  OECD Hearing on Enhanced International Cooperation in Paris, 2014-06-17; see footnote #. 
3  See on these issues with extensive references Budzinski 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2008a, 2014. 
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(Campbell & Trebilcock 1993, 1997) and the mandatory lead jurisdiction concept (Trebilcock & Iacobucci 
2004; Budzinski 2008a: 166-168, 203-206).4 
5. The advanced comity principle, which represents the core element of the voluntary lead 
jurisdiction model, significantly extends the standard comity principles. If an anticompetitive arrangement 
or practice is to be reviewed by more than one competition policy regime (according to their respective 
standards), the affected jurisdictions appoint a lead jurisdiction, whose antitrust authority is designated to 
play the role of a coordinating agency (Campbell & Trebilcock 1993: 149-150, 1997: 109-110; Rowley, 
Wakil & Campbell 2000: 27-28). The latter implies that the lead jurisdiction does not suspend the reviews 
of the other involved jurisdictions. Instead, it coordinates their reviews, i.e. it collects and distributes 
information from the interacting agencies and, thereby, ensuring mutual comity (i.e. mutual respect for 
each other’s legitimate interests). Eventually, the coordinating agency compiles a common but non-binding 
recommendation regarding remedies, which integrates the competition-oriented interests of the 
participating jurisdictions, in order to generate a coherent treatment of a specific international 
anticompetitive arrangement or practice. Each regime that claims jurisdiction over the case then decides 
the case on its own and it remains to its own deliberation whether and how far it considers the 
recommendation of the lead jurisdiction. Thus, the voluntary lead jurisdiction model includes permanent 
opt-in and opt-out options: any regime may decide at any stage whether to enter the cooperation and/or 
follow the recommendations as well as similarly decide to opt-out of the cooperation and proceed with its 
own stance towards the case in question. Consequently, the voluntary lead jurisdiction model may not 
considerably enhance the existing cooperation – in particular, in all the cases where the involved 
jurisdictions are reluctant to share their insights and not willing to adjust their own decisions according to 
the lead recommendations. In other cases, however, the level of cooperation may be significantly enhanced 
if the involved agencies engage in cooperation with the lead jurisdiction and adopt the decision 
recommendation as a guideline for their own decision. In summary, it will be case-dependent if 
cooperation is enhanced or not. 
6. The mandatory lead jurisdiction model extends the concept of cooperation via the appointment of 
a lead jurisdiction by allocating ‘hard’ competences and responsibility for multijurisdictional competition 
cases to one of the affected regimes that subsequently handles and decides the case with a view to avoiding 
anticompetitive effects in the overall geographic market (i.e. in all affected jurisdictions) and by relying on 
the assistance of the other involved regimes. The mandatory character of this model lies in the binding 
character of the lead jurisdiction’s decision: the decision of the lead agency binds the other affected 
jurisdictions. Thus, opt-in and opt-out options are reduced to the decision of joining the model or not. Once 
a jurisdiction has committed to the mandatory lead jurisdiction model, it cannot opt-out anymore.5 It is this 
more advanced and more ambitious version of the lead jurisdiction concept that I will refer to in this paper. 
7. The second concept is the idea of multilevel governance (Kerber 2003) in which regimes on 
different vertical levels (regional, national, supranational) are interconnected with each other. In such a 
complex multilevel system of institutions, the allocation of competences becomes particularly important 
(Budzinski 2008a). At the same time, different types of competences (for instance, rule-making, rule-
                                                     
4  Diane Wood pointed in the hearing discussion rightfully to the interesting fact that the U.S. antitrust law 
system uses an institution in cases of multiple antitrust procedures among U.S. states that bears some 
similarities to these concepts, namely the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, established in 1968. It 
entails the option of combining parallel proceedings into a single one, unifying the case (see in more detail 
Ostolaza & Hartmann 2005; Heyburn & McGovern 2012). 
5  It would be possible to relate this opt-in option to each single case, i.e. that participating competition policy 
regimes decide in each single case whether they commit to the lead jurisdiction model or not. For reasons 
of simplicity, however, I will assume in the following that jurisdictions who commit to the model do so for 
all upcoming cases.  
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applying and enforcement competences or substantive and procedural competences) can be allocated to 
different levels, so that a division of labor occurs. The advantage of adding the vertical multilevel 
dimension to the lead jurisdiction concept lies in the option to introduce a referee authority, monitoring and 
supervising the impartiality of the assigned lead jurisdiction and providing conflict resolution if necessary. 
Thus, in this concept, the antitrust institutions on the top level (the supranational or even global level) are 
not about materially deciding cases. Instead, they allocate lead jurisdiction according to agreed-upon 
criteria on a case basis6, monitor and supervise the lead jurisdiction in respect of its impartial treatment of 
anticompetitive effects in the overall relevant international market (irrespective where – in which 
jurisdiction – the effects display) and settle conflicts in case of affected jurisdictions allege that their 
domestic effects (legitimate interests) were disregarded by the lead jurisdiction. Consequently, ‘only’ 
procedural competences are assigned to the top level and all material and substantive decision competences 
remain on the level of the existing competition policy regimes that include national, regional-supranational 
(e.g. the EU) and regional-subnational regimes (e.g. State antitrust in the U.S.).  
8. From an economic perspective, the charm of this concept is that it  
• replaces the inbound focus of existing competition policy regimes by a focus embracing all 
effects in the relevant geographic (international) market, 
• provides a one-stop shop for the companies (thus avoiding deficient transaction and 
administration costs of multiple procedures),  
• closes many loopholes due to the lead jurisdiction being powerful and also providing protection 
of competition abroad, and  
• maintains diversity of competition regimes7 because each assigned lead jurisdiction handles and 
decides the case according to this regime’s antitrust rules and procedures, just with the explicit 
inclusion of cross-border effects.  
9. On the downside, it requires an international agreement on procedural rules (in particular criteria 
for allocating case-specific lead jurisdiction as well as for monitoring and conflict resolution mechanisms) 
and willingness to accept  
• procedural decisions by the international level and  
• material decisions by the lead jurisdiction as long as all effects are treated impartially irrespective 
of their jurisdictional location. 
10. After outlining the basic properties of the concept, the next section explores more deeply into its 
details. 
                                                     
6  This only refers to multijurisdictional cases; cases that display effects merely within one of the existing 
competition policy regimes are solely subject to this regime’s jurisdiction. See for more details about 
possible notification and referral rules in a multilevel competition policy system Budzinski (2009: 379)  
7  On the benefits of regime diversity in competition policy see Kerber & Budzinski (2004); Budzinski 
(2008a: 64-83); Budzinski (2008b). 
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3. Competence Allocation within a Multilevel Lead-Jurisdiction Model 
3.1 Enhanced Cooperation I: Allocating and Supervising Lead Jurisdiction Competence 
11. The notion of assigning a lead jurisdiction with ‘hard’ competences of handling, investigating 
and deciding a given case requires a cooperative forum that manages the selection process and safeguards 
an appropriate case-handling. Such a forum could be either (i) an international organization or agency, 
consisting of an independent body, or – more in the spirit of enhanced cooperation -  (ii) an international 
forum or panel consisting of representatives of participating competition policy regimes.8 For reasons of 
convenience, I call it the International Competition Panel (ICP) in the following.9 The enhanced 
cooperation in the multilevel lead jurisdiction model requires the implementation of such a forum that is 
equipped with considerable procedural competences. However, it does not require substantive antitrust 
laws at this international level of cooperation – and as such the mandatory lead jurisdiction model (as 
ambitious as it is) remains a modest proposal compared to far-reaching ideas of global competition laws 
and agencies.10  
12. Notwithstanding, it needs to be equipped with considerable procedural competences, namely 
competences (i) regarding the selection of competent jurisdictions according to the mandatory lead 
jurisdiction model and (ii) to review, monitor and supervise rules and practices of participating competition 
policy regimes in order to safeguard that the regimes are able to apply their laws according to a 
nondiscrimination principle also to effects abroad (Budzinski 2008a: 178-182).11 Consequently, the ICP 
neither creates its own substantive competition law, nor does it apply or enforce substantive competition 
law directly. Instead, it is the lead jurisdiction that applies its own competition rules to a given 
anticompetitive arrangement or practice and enforces the outcome of its proceedings. In contrast, the ICP 
competences can be specified to include the following three elements: 
(i) Selection of Lead Jurisdiction 
13. If a case occurs that would lead to multiple procedures among the members of the system (see 
more detailed section 3.3), the ICP appoints a lead jurisdiction according to a defined set of criteria. As a 
potential lead jurisdiction for a given anticompetitive arrangement or practice qualifies any competition 
policy regime (Budzinski 2011: 85-86). 
(a) whose internal markets represent a regional gravity of the market activities (e.g. aggregate 
turnover of the participating enterprises); 
 
                                                     
8  For different models how to equip such a forum or panel with representatives from the participating 
competition policy regimes (including rotation schemes) see Budzinski (2009: 379-381). 
9  It may be possible to employ the ICN or some of its structures for this purpose. 
10  Examples for the latter include the Doha Declaration of introducing competition rules into the WTO 
framework or the academic proposal of the DIAC (Fikentscher & Immenga 1995; Fox 1997, 1998; Zäch 
1999; Drexl 2003, 2004; Budzinski 2008a: 134-141). 
11  It is important to emphasize that the ICP cannot prescribe competition policy rules or practices; it is only 
entitled to combat discriminatory rules and practices. This distinction is important from an institutional-
economics perspective (Hayek 1975; Kerber 1993; Wegner 1997) since (a) a prohibition excludes only one 
specific option from the non-determined set of possible options, whereas (b) a prescription effectively 
eliminates any scope of selection and de facto excludes all the other options by prescribing one of them. In 
the first case, the regimes maintain behavioural freedom, including the freedom to create innovative 
solutions; both is effectively eroded in the second case. 
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(b) whose agency enforces a working and nondiscriminatory competition law; 
(c) whose agency disposes over sufficient capacities and competences for the case in question; and 
(d) that demonstrates (and has demonstrated) the willingness and experience to investigate, 
handle and decide the case with a view of protecting all affected consumers and markets, i.e. 
to safeguard comity to other jurisdictions’ legitimate interests.  
14. The ICP appoints the competition policy regime to act as the lead jurisdiction that best fulfils 
these four criteria. In many cases, the choice will be rather obvious, if not, the ICP enjoys a limited but 
inevitable discretionary scope. The lead jurisdiction receives full competences to deal with the respective 
anticompetitive arrangement or practice under the obligation of nondiscrimination and pursuance of the 
common welfare of all affected consumers irrespective of their location. It forms a team with all the other 
jurisdictions whose internal markets are affected by the anticompetitive arrangement or practice in 
question. The non-lead jurisdictions provide support and assistance to the lead jurisdiction, injecting their 
concerns, views and competences into the investigation and decision-finding proceedings. 
15. Criterion (a) reflects the concept of a primary effects clause (Trebilcock & Iacobucci 2004). In 
order to minimize incentives for strategic competition policies and discriminatory action by the lead 
jurisdiction, this criterion focuses on market effects, i.e. effects on consumers (Neven & Röller 2005; 
Haucap et al. 2006). Alternatively, the location of companies and their production facilities could be 
considered as well, however, entailing the danger of strategic locational interests trumping consumer 
welfare considerations. 
(ii) Supervision and Sanctions 
16. The ICP reviews the competition rules and codified practices of the participating competition 
policy regimes regarding violations of the nondiscrimination principle. In cases of discriminatory rules or 
practices, it demands the modification of the respective provisions (however, without prescribing 
alternative designs). If the respective competition policy regime refuses to adjust its rules and practices 
accordingly, this regime is disqualified and suspended as a potential lead jurisdiction. This procedure also 
applies to safeguard a minimum necessary nexus with an anticompetitive arrangement or practice to claim 
jurisdiction.12 Additionally, the ICP supervises the review and decision process by the lead jurisdiction, but 
exclusively concerning violations of nondiscrimination. Potential sanctions, again, refer to the qualification 
of an acting lead jurisdiction for future cases. 
(iii) Complaints and Conflict Resolution 
17. The ICP hears and reviews complaints from jurisdictions or enterprises (a) about decisions of the 
lead jurisdiction, which disregard foreign consumers and/or nondiscrimination, and (b) about 
discriminatory rules or practices of competition policy regimes (including insufficient nexus). Any 
complaints by parties to the case about wrong assessments by the competent antitrust authority or dissents 
regarding the facts of a case fall under the competency of the courts and appellation bodies within the lead 
jurisdiction. In this sense, ICP provides a cooperative forum to deal with conflicts between jurisdictions. 
18. While the ICP represents the final instance regarding its supervision and conflict resolution tasks, 
an appellation body regarding its jurisdictional decisions (i.e. appointment of the appropriate lead 
jurisdiction) may be helpful. An international court could be one suitable solution, a second chamber of the 
                                                     
12  Claiming jurisdiction without a sufficient nexus to the respective arrangement can be interpreted as 
representing an indirect kind of discrimination.  
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panel another. The latter may be preferable in order to keep the selection procedure compact. Otherwise, 
transaction costs and the administrative burden on business would increase, deteriorating institutional 
efficiency. 
3.2 Enhanced Cooperation II: Investigating, Handling and Deciding Cases 
19. The second level of enhanced international cooperation represents the one where the cases are 
actually decided and, consequently, which disposes of substantive antitrust competences. It consists of all 
participating competition policy regimes, which may be (i) joint competition policy regimes of 
confederations or associations of independent countries, (ii) national competition policy regimes, or (iii) 
subnational ‘local’ competition policy regimes. These competition policy regimes retain their full rule-
making, rule-application, and enforcement competences for cross-border anticompetitive arrangements and 
practices if the ICP appoints them to be lead jurisdiction in the respective case. Each regime autonomously 
shapes its own substantive competition rules, enforcement institutions, and agencies (including an 
individual composition of elements of the court system, government and independent administration 
system, and private litigation) – but minus discriminatory provisions and practices, which are excluded and 
sanctioned by the ICP. Against the background of these non-discriminatory institutions and practices, each 
regime is obliged to consider competitive effects outside its territory according to the common welfare of 
all affected consumers. Apart from that, the appointed lead jurisdiction is free to handle the referred case. 
Eventually, the lead jurisdiction issues a decision on the case that may detail different remedies for 
different regional effects (in different countries).13 However, due to the lead jurisdiction treatment, the 
decision displays overall coherence.  
20. The lead jurisdiction is expected to team up with the other affected antitrust regimes.14 Insofar, 
the actual casework of the appointed lead jurisdiction requires enhanced international cooperation as well. 
The appointed lead jurisdiction acts to the outside as the one-stop-shopping contact for the norm 
addressees (companies suspected to infringe competition law, their competitors, customers, affected 
consumers, etc.). It enjoys the power to investigate and decide the case according to its own laws, practices 
and institutions (but with a view to all effects, domestic and abroad). In doing so, the lead agency leads a 
cooperative team consisting of all agencies whose internal markets are affected by the case. The non-lead 
agencies play an important role in this part of the multilevel lead jurisdiction model. On the one hand, they 
assist the lead agency by providing support in terms of local investigation force and their ‘local knowledge 
advantages’ (from being close to their markets). Moreover, they contribute resources and special 
competences that are needed in the case in question and cannot be provided by the lead agency alone. For 
instance, an involved non-lead agency may possess specific competences regarding sophisticated economic 
methods and may, at request, employ them to provide the lead agency with additional evidence. On the 
other hand, the cooperation within the team of affected jurisdictions also offers the opportunity for non-
lead jurisdictions to inject their views, theories of harm and competition-oriented interests into the 
proceedings, thus increasing the probability that the outcome will satisfy their demands. It can be expected 
that close cooperation between the lead agency and the other involved agencies during the actual case 
handling will promote the emergence of a common view on the case in question and, thereby, erode the 
scope for conflicts about the decision and remedies to a significant extent. 
 
                                                     
13  For instance, in the case of an international hardcore cartel, the lead agency may specify what penalties 
(amounts) have to be paid to which jurisdictions’ authorities, depending on the harm that the cartel caused 
in these jurisdictions. 
14  Again, violations of this cooperation imperative have a negative impact on the probability of future lead 
jurisdiction appointments. 
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21. When it comes to lead jurisdiction appointments, existing supranational regimes may be a natural 
candidate. The most comprehensive example is represented by the EU Competition Policy System, which 
contains full-fledged competition rules and an experienced antitrust practice. Additionally, there are 
antitrust provisions and agencies on a supranational level in the context of several other multicountry 
associations. For instance, both the Andean Community and the UEMOA (Union Economique et 
Monétaire Ouest Africaine) have implemented their own competition policy agencies, theoretically 
competent in enforcing specifically shaped community competition rules. Practically, however, both 
regimes are currently rather inactive. Comparatively elaborate competition policy competences are located 
at the EFTA (European Free Trade Association) Surveillance Authority, whereas free trade and economic 
integration associations, like NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), ASEAN (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations), Mercosur (Mercado Común del Conor Sur), CIS (Community of Independent 
[former soviet] States), CARICOM (Carribean Community and Common Market), FTAA (Free Trade 
Area of the Americas), SADC (South African Development Community), or CEN-SAD (Community of 
Sahel-Saharan States), currently only possess at best rudimental antitrust provisions. Meanwhile, 
COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) is also reaching for implementing 
considerable supranational competition policy competences. 
22. Following the paragon of the EU, these associations and confederations might develop effective 
competition policy regimes with considerable competition policy competences in the course of time. 
Developed ones represent natural candidates for lead jurisdiction appointments as they jurisdictionally 
include a number of national markets and address consumers of different countries. Therefore, they 
automatically internalise parts of the externalities arising from cross-border business activities. 
Furthermore, supranational agencies may be less prone to strategic competition policy because they are 
experienced of considering effects on different countries. 
23. Since currently only one effective supranational antitrust regime exists, the majority of cases is 
likely to remain within the second type of regimes at this level of enhanced international cooperation, 
namely national regimes, in the short- and medium-run. In particular, national competition policy regimes 
with large and important internal markets are likely to be frequently appointed as lead jurisdictions. Above 
all, this refers to the U.S. Antitrust System. However, the competition policy regimes of countries like 
Canada, Australia, Brazil, Japan, Russia, China, India, and many more also represent frequent candidates if 
they qualify for a lead jurisdiction appointment.15  
24. Most likely, local (subnational) competition policy regimes will only infrequently qualify as lead 
jurisdictions for cross-border antitrust cases. Their domains are local anticompetitive arrangements and 
practices because, in this respect, they can exploit their advantages of being very close to the locally-
affected markets. In such cases, however, they play an important role within a sound multilevel 
competition policy system. Particularly large countries with considerably segmented internal markets may 
benefit from local competition policy competences. Despite ongoing market globalisation, regional and 
local markets are unlikely to be completely eroded. Therefore, the scope for regional and local (including 
subnational) competition policy regimes is a sustainable one. 
                                                     
15  Next to inhabiting the regional gravity of the aggregate turnover of the participating enterprises, a 
qualification to become appointed lead jurisdiction requires the absence of discriminatory provisions and 
practices as well as the proven willingness and experience to employ a world welfare standard (see above). 
This implies that some of the above mentioned countries might face a long way to go until they meet these 
criteria. Note, however, that the possibility to qualify as lead jurisdiction can entail important incentives to 
develop national competition policy regimes according to the modern international standards. 
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3.3 Which Cases Qualify for Being Handled by the Multilevel Lead Jurisdiction Model? 
25. From the outset of the motivating factors for considering a far-reaching cooperation like a 
multilevel mandatory lead jurisdiction model on it is clear that its competence should be limited to those 
cases where the multijurisdictional treatment causes costs, burden and harm. In other words, only truly 
multijurisdictional cases should qualify for being subject to the system. While the notion of truly 
multijurisdictional may sound simple and straightforward at first sight, the devil may hide in the details.  
26. A basic approach may start with the existing notification rules and picking criteria of the 
participating national and supranational regimes and simply state an X-plus rule (Budzinski 2008a: 196-
199) for the adoption of a case into the lead jurisdiction system. The idea is that anticompetitive 
arrangements and practices with cross-border effects should be allocated ‘upwards’ (to treatment in the 
lead jurisdiction model), whereas other cases should remain within the national competence. As a very 
simple proxy for market affection serves the number of jurisdictions, in which a specific arrangement or 
practice would be subject to review. If this number exceeds a defined value of X (for instance, X = 3 or X 
= 5), it can be assumed that it generates with a sufficient probability significant cross-border spillovers, 
which justify its inclusion into the lead jurisdiction model. An advantage of using such a simplistic 
criterion is its simple application that does not create much cost and is rather transparent. As always, this 
advantage comes along with a disadvantage, notably the different sizes of the national regimes: if X = 3 
this may refer to three comparatively small countries (say, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) or to three 
comparatively big countries (say, the U.S., Mexico, and Brazil). Obviously, it makes a difference for the 
‘truly multijurisdictional character’ whether the first or the second scenario applies. Thus, the X could be 
complemented by a factor representing the size of a regime’s internal market (or population), an addition 
that would somewhat increase the complexity of delineating the lead jurisdiction cases from the others but 
may still remain sufficiently simple and transparent enough. Unfortunately, there is no scientific way of 
determining X or the correcting factor, so that would be up for a political consensus.16 
27. In order to avoid strategic behaviour, a multilevel lead jurisdiction model requires rules about 
notification and picking thresholds on the level of the existing regimes. The participating competition 
policy regimes need adequate notification thresholds for mergers and interfirm cooperative arrangements 
and respective rules for picking up cartels and other anticompetitive arrangements or practices in order to 
avoid that jurisdiction is claimed even if no sufficient nexus with the (anti-) competitive effects of a 
business arrangement or practice exists. In this field, the already existing ICN best practice 
recommendations on sufficient nexus for claiming jurisdiction may serve as a focal point. Furthermore, the 
specifics of the different types of competition cases – cartels, mergers and acquisitions, abuse-of-
dominance cases – require different treatments in this regard.17  
4. Limits and Problems of Lead Jurisdiction Concepts 
28. Even though the concept of a multilevel lead jurisdiction model entails the potential to solve the 
remaining problems of international competition policy through an enhanced, deeper and more systematic 
cooperation among the existing competition policy regimes (and without creating new international 
substantive competition law), it contains a number of inherent problems – like every concept does. In the 
                                                     
16  For alternative case allocation rules (that, however, tend to perform worse) see Budzinski (2008a: 168-199). 
17  Gal (2010) presents an interesting example of a solution for horizontal hardcore cartels that may prove to 
be very compatible with the ideas outlined in this paper. See also Michal Gal’s contribution to this hearing. 
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following, selected problems are discussed with a view to their severity and to possibilities of alleviating 
them.18 
4.1 The Incentive Problem 
29. Probably the most crucial problem relates to the incentive of an appointed lead jurisdiction to 
conduct the given case without privileging its own jurisdiction’s interests and without discriminating 
against the interests of the other affected jurisdictions. For the system to work, the lead jurisdiction must 
decide the case with consumer welfare in all affected markets in mind and, thus, pursuing international 
welfare instead of national welfare. In economic language, it can be said that the lead jurisdiction is 
expected to provide a positive externality, i.e. producing a benefit for the other affected jurisdictions 
without gaining a direct benefit for itself (in addition to its benefits if it would pursue the case with only 
national welfare in mind). In many cases this may be rather unproblematic though since competition cases 
often display similar or comparable effects in different jurisdictions. For instance, a hardcore cartel will 
reduce welfare in all the national markets it sells its products and, similarly, a merger to monopoly will be 
detrimental to welfare everywhere. Consequently, in such cases, the lead jurisdiction does not run into a 
serious conflict and mainly needs to consider the rectified foreign effects when deciding the extent of 
sanctions and remedies. The perspective of reciprocity among the involved jurisdictions may suffice to 
motivate a fair treatment of all effects by the lead jurisdiction in such cases. 
30. Obviously, the crucial cases are the ones where the interests of the lead jurisdiction stand in 
(partial) conflict to those of (some of) the other affected jurisdictions. Or, in other words, the cases in 
which a treatment according to national welfare only would lead to a different assessment than a treatment 
considering the effects abroad. A reason for such a deviation of interests and/or regional effects may be 
that producers and consumers are unevenly distributed across the involved jurisdictions (Barros & Cabral 
1994; Head & Ries 1997). Consider for instance a case where the lead jurisdiction predominantly 
domiciles the (e.g. cartelizing or merging) producers, whereas the consumers are predominantly located in 
the other jurisdictions.19 Then, a national welfare treatment by the lead jurisdiction may imply that (the 
many) efficiency gains outweigh (the few) consumer disadvantages, whereas an investigation across all the 
affected markets would reveal the opposite result (because the weight of the producer-side advantages 
decreases vis-à-vis the demand-side disadvantages). In such cases, the lead jurisdiction could be tempted to 
privilege its own interests over the legitimate interests of the other affected jurisdictions. However, while 
the theoretical treatment of this problem in industrial economics shows that cases like this are possible, 
model theory also demonstrates that cases like this can only surface under rather heroic assumptions. 
Consequently, they may actually occur, albeit rather infrequently because they are rather special – and by 
far do not represent the typical case of conflicting interests. The following type of cases represents a much 
more likely scenario: a purely competition-oriented analysis would yield the same result for national and 
international welfare (i.e. consumer harm prevails). However, there is strong lobbyism for the domestic 
producers, be it by industry lobbyism or by political influence (promoting national champions, improving 
national competitiveness, etc.). Competition policy decisions biased by economic patriotism most typically 
do not enhance national welfare and this type of competitiveness-promoting policies usually serves to 
boost the welfare of powerful/influential/well-organized groups within the national economy at the 
expense of domestic consumers, domestic competitors (in particular less influential small-and-medium-
sized companies), and foreign jurisdictions (Budzinski 2008a: 53-64). Still, the competition agency of an 
                                                     
18  For several more problems and barriers to implementing such ambitious concepts of enhanced interagency 
cooperation see the contribution of John Temple Lang to this hearing. 
19  It is questionable, though, whether such a lead jurisdiction selection actually meets the selection criteria 
outlined n section 3.1. 
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appointed lead jurisdiction may face considerable pressure to bias its decision accordingly when the stakes 
are sufficiently high.20 
31. However, there are a couple of disciplining factors that may reduce the risk of discriminatory 
treatment. First, the assigned responsibility for all the effects of a competition case may actually strengthen 
the position of the appointed agency vis-à-vis domestic influence groups and thus increase its ability to 
withstand pressure from vested interests. Under the conditions of the sketched multilevel lead jurisdiction 
model, the responsible lead agency itself experiences strong incentives to act as it is expected to be. The 
ICN-experience shows how effective peer pressure can be in terms of disciplining competition authorities 
and in terms of strengthening their position within the national policy systems (theoretical treatment: 
Budzinski 2004a; empirical evidence: Rowley & Campbell 2005; Evenett & Hijzen 2006). These rather 
‘soft’ disciplining mechanisms should not be underestimated. Moreover, any appointed lead jurisdiction 
needs to consider that a discriminatory case handling inherently backfires: the probability of being selected 
as a lead jurisdiction in the future depends, inter alia, on the jurisdiction’s behavioural history (see 
selection criteria in section 3.1). Thus, a rational lead jurisdiction has to weigh the benefits of a strategic 
decision of the given case against the disadvantages of losing lead jurisdiction appointments in future cases 
(plus reputation losses, all corrected by discount rates). While there may be cases that may appear to be 
worth it from the viewpoint of the lead jurisdiction, in most cases the balancing exercise should point 
towards a nondiscriminatory handling and decision (Budzinski 2011: 91). The latter is further supported by 
the danger that more independent revision instances (e.g. law courts) may scrap the discriminating decision 
anyway – the probability of which may vary considerably across jurisdictions, though. 
4.2 Divergent Laws Problem 
32. Another problem originates from divergent competition laws and policies in different 
jurisdictions. Even with lead jurisdictions that handle cases according to nondiscriminatory treatment and 
international welfare focus, case decisions may differ depending on the chosen lead jurisdiction due to 
differences in law and practices. Next to substantive differences in law, like for instance the transatlantic 
divide on sanctions against cartels (monetary fines against companies only in Europe versus a combination 
of company fines and criminal prosecution of acting managers in North-America), divergent case decisions 
may be caused by differences in the applied theories – both theories of harm and underlying economic 
theories. For instance, different outcomes of merger control assessments of the same case in the EU and the 
U.S. are not so much rooted in the (minor) differences of how the prohibition criterion is phrased 
(significant lessening of competition vs. significant impediment of effective competition). Instead, they are 
caused by referring to different economic theories and differences in the – always uncertain – assessment 
of probabilities of future effects and counterfactual effects. The same can be claimed for differences in the 
treatment of vertical effects. However, notwithstanding these competition-policy-inherent divergences, 
empirically the most relevant divergences in the past originated from strategic policies and the inbound 
focus (disregarding effects that affect markets abroad) – like in virtually all of the famous transatlantic 
conflict cases (Boeing-MDD, GE-Honeywell, Amadeus, etc.21). Since this reason for divergent outcomes 
should disappear if all effects are considered in a nondiscriminatory way, the remaining scope for 
divergent case decisions (depending on the assigned lead jurisdiction) may actually not be that significant 
anymore. This is further reinforced by the success story of the best practice convergence in the course of 
the ICN work that has reduced differences in competition policy practices to a considerable extent (Rowley 
& Campbell 2005; Evenett & Hijzen 2006).  
                                                     
20  The transatlantic antitrust ‚wars' over the Boeing-MDD-merger (Fox 1998b) and the eventually aborted 
GE-Honeywell-proposal (Gerber 2003) offer prime examples. 
21  See with further references Budzinski (2008a: 32-64). 
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33. Still, running a (mandatory) lead jurisdiction concept requires the acceptance of some scope for 
divergent ‘outcomes’ – referring to divergences between the actual lead jurisdiction decision and 
counterfactual decisions by other affected jurisdictions if they had run their own proceedings22 – that 
remains despite the safeguarding and alleviating factors. The participating jurisdictions need to live with a 
limited degree of inconsistency in terms of equal treatment of equal cases with different lead 
jurisdictions.23 Notwithstanding, the cooperation among the lead jurisdiction and the other involved 
jurisdiction on the second level of enhanced cooperation (section 3.2) will contribute to improving 
acceptance of lead decisions. In addition, on a more psychological or behavioural (economics) note, once a 
lead jurisdiction system is running, there are no actual divergent outcomes anymore, which is one of the 
advantages of such a model. Instead, it is just hypothetical (counterfactual) divergent outcomes – what 
would have been decided if another jurisdiction had been appointed as lead jurisdiction. 
34. From another angle, the remaining scope for applying different theories of harm and different 
underlying economic theories may actually viewed to be an advantage of the multilevel lead jurisdiction 
model. Sustaining a limited diversity of regimes, theories and practices allows for beneficial institutional 
learning (Kerber & Budzinski 2004). The economics of competition and antitrust are a dynamic field of 
science that does not rest upon one everlasting and true unifying theory. Instead, the dynamics of theory 
innovation and development are intense, both due to inner-science factors and due to the dynamics of the 
object of analysis (Budzinski 2008b). Limited diversity of policies, then, offers scope for injecting new 
knowledge into competition policy practice, testing new theories (parallel experimentation) and thus 
speeding up the knowledge accumulation process. As such, it may actually be beneficial to live with a 
limited extent of divergent laws, practices and policies as well as (counterfactual) divergent outcomes. 
4.3 Lack-of-Eligible-Lead-Jurisdiction Problem 
35. Eventually, I address a problem that may frustrate the workability of the lead jurisdiction system 
if it is empirically relevant. There may be a danger that too few regimes fulfil the criteria of becoming a 
lead jurisdiction so that the same handful of big agencies will lead all the cases. In other words, the market 
for lead jurisdiction may not be competitive but instead dominated by a narrow oligopoly of regimes – or 
even a dominant U.S.-EU-duopoly. The reason is that in particular small regimes may struggle to be 
selected as lead jurisdiction: firstly, they are less likely to accumulate significant shares of the relevant 
market activities within their domestic markets and, secondly, they may lack capacity and (sophisticated) 
competence to deal with major multijurisdictional cases. As such, the criteria for lead jurisdiction 
appointments laid out in section 3.1 entail a tendency to favour experienced and well-equipped agencies as 
well as such with a large domestic market. This may represent a problem for three reasons: 
• if many jurisdictions virtually have no chance of becoming a lead jurisdiction, this may 
undermine their acceptance of the overall system and of lead decisions due to a lack of (felt) 
own influence. 
 
                                                     
22  Note that within the system there cannot be divergent outcomes of a given case anymore due to the one-
stop-shop at the lead jurisdiction. The fact that all divergences will be only hypothetical – in the sense of 
as-if outcomes in the counterfactual that another agency would have run the case – may actually 
(psychologically, behaviorally) contribute to a better acceptance of lead agency decisions because 
divergences are not immediately visible anymore. 
23  However, competition cases are never really equal, further reducing the perceptibility of this problem – 
once the system is up and running. 
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• if the ICP faces a narrow and powerful oligopoly of agencies that qualify for lead jurisdiction 
tasks, it may become difficult to enforce the fundamental principles of nondiscriminatory 
treatment and international welfare orientation due to a lack of alternatives in case that these 
agencies do not comply. 
• if jurisdictions become disconnected to international cases due to their inability to qualify as 
lead jurisdictions, then this may also negatively influence their capabilities to deal with 
domestic cases.  
36. However, some alleviating factors may imply that this problem is not so severe empirically. First, 
there will be many cases that are sufficiently multijurisdictional to warrant their inclusion in the multilevel 
lead jurisdiction model but that are sufficiently regional in terms of their impact to qualify other than the 
big regimes to serve as lead jurisdiction. Note that the phenomenon we usually label as globalisation 
includes considerable trends of (interjurisdictional) regionalization as well. Second, enhanced international 
cooperation while ‘doing’ the case (see section 3.2) may alleviate to some degree a lack of agency size and 
experience since other affected jurisdictions may assist the lead jurisdiction, also with capacities and 
specialised competences (like economic expertise). Third, (again) enhanced international cooperation II 
helps non-lead agencies to remain connected with the international environment and with the development, 
experience and progress that is associated with it. 
37. Eventually, the real problem may actually stand in sharp contrast to this discussion: (some) 
regimes with small but open national economies may experience incentives to free ride on the lead 
jurisdiction system and downgrade their own competition policy regime. Instead of aiming to qualify for 
lead jurisdiction duties (which always involves to some extent the necessity to provide a positive 
externality), these regimes may opt for saving resources and rely on the decisions of lead jurisdictions 
regarding the desired level of protection of competition. Notwithstanding, there may not be so many 
jurisdictions in reality that find it attractive to revert to this free-riding position. As soon as a jurisdiction 
experiences a non-negligible number of purely domestic antitrust cases (where it cannot rely on foreign 
agencies to protect competition and welfare), it is not rational to limit domestic competition policy 
activities to a free rider position. 
5. Conclusion 
38. This contribution discusses a possible avenue towards rationalizing multiple competition policy 
procedures by an enhanced international cooperation. The concept of a multilevel lead jurisdiction model 
represents an interesting step to combine the concepts of lead jurisdictions and multilevel governance. The 
advantage of adding the vertical multilevel dimension to the lead jurisdiction concept lies in the option to 
introduce a referee authority, monitoring and supervising the impartiality of the assigned lead jurisdictions 
and providing conflict resolution if necessary. Thus, cooperation among competition agencies on the global 
level (enhanced cooperation I) is not about materially deciding cases. Instead, it allocates lead jurisdiction 
according to agreed-upon criteria on a case basis, monitor and supervise the lead jurisdiction in respect of 
its impartial treatment of anticompetitive effects in the overall relevant international market (irrespective 
where – in which jurisdiction – the effects display) and settle conflicts in case of affected jurisdictions 
allege that their domestic effects were disregarded by the lead jurisdiction.  
39. Consequently, all material and substantive decision competences remain on the level of the 
existing national and regional-supranational regimes. Here, each competition case is dealt with by a team 
of affected jurisdictions. While the lead jurisdiction acts to the outside as the one-stop-shopping contact for 
the companies (and other involved parties) and enjoys the power to investigate and decide the case 
according to its own laws, practices and institutions (but with a view to all effects, domestic and abroad), 
the actual case handling internally consists of interagency cooperation as well (enhanced cooperation II). 
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The lead agency leads a cooperative team consisting of all agencies whose internal markets are affected by 
the case. The non-lead agencies inject their views and (competition-) interests into the case and provide 
assisting force, resources and competences. 
40. From an economic perspective, the charm of this concept is that it (i) replaces the inbound focus 
of existing competition policy regimes by a focus embracing all effects in the relevant geographic 
(international) market, (ii) provides a one-stop shop for the norm addressees (thus avoiding deficient 
transaction and administration costs of multiple procedures), (iii) closes many loopholes due to the lead 
jurisdiction being powerful and also providing protection of competition abroad, and (iv) maintains 
diversity of competition regimes because each assigned lead jurisdiction handles and decides the case 
according to this regime’s antitrust rules and procedures, just with the explicit inclusion of cross-border 
effects. On the downside, it requires an international agreement on procedural rules (in particular criteria 
for allocating case-specific lead jurisdiction as well as for monitoring and conflict resolution mechanisms) 
and willingness to accept (i) procedural decisions by the international level and (ii) material decisions by 
the lead jurisdiction as long as all effects are treated impartially irrespective of their jurisdictional location. 
This certainly represents a higher hurdle for consensus than the ICN-style network cooperation, but 
certainly a lower hurdle than consensus on binding global competition rules within the WTO framework. 
And from an economic perspective, such a multilevel lead jurisdiction model appears to be welfare-
superior to these alternatives. Furthermore, there are many ways of taking steps into the direction of a 
serious lead jurisdiction model but with extensive (case-related) opt-in and opt-out options in order to 
reduce the commitment hurdle.  
41. At the end of the day, the concept of a multilevel lead jurisdiction model is far from being 
comprehensively researched and completely developed. Still, it does represent one of the more interesting 
avenues for thinking about enhanced cooperation.  
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